The complete subtree (CS) method is widely accepted for the broadcast encryption. A new method for assigning keys in the CS method is proposed in this paper. The essential idea behind the proposed method is to use two trapdoor permutations. Using the trapdoor information, the key management center computes and assigns a key to each terminal so that the terminal can derive all information necessary in the CS method. A terminal has to keep just one key, while log 2 N + 1 keys were needed in the original CS method where N is the number of all terminals. The permutations to be used need to satisfy a certain property which is similar to but slightly different from the claw-free property. The needed property, named strongly semi-claw-free property, is formalized in terms of probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, and its relation to the claw-free property is discussed. It is also shown that if the used permutations fulfill the strongly semi-claw-free property, then the proposed method is secure against attacks of malicious users.
Introduction
Recent development of technologies enables services which deliver digital contents to users through a high-speed network or large-capacity (and low-cost) storage media such as DVD. In such a service, it is essential to protect the contents from malicious users and eavesdroppers who try to obtain the contents without paying. An important aspect of such services is that the delivery of the digital contents can be regarded as "broadcasting," that is, an identical information (possibly encrypted contents) is delivered to all users. To protect digital contents, we need to encrypt the contents so that only valid users can decrypt it. This kind of problem is sometimes called a user revocation or a broadcast encryption [3] .
A simple method for the user revocation is to renew keys periodically [9] , [10] . In this case, a center (an administrator of the system) delivers a new key to valid users individually, and the old key in a valid user's terminal is replaced by the new key. This method is simple and secure, but there are some problems. For example, users must keep their terminals "online" to receive new keys. This assumption is not serious in some services such as cable TV and satellite broadcasting, but it is unacceptable in many cases. For example, we cannot force users to connect their DVD players to a computer network. Other problems include the cost of the terminal. Terminals which have capability to renew keys are more expensive than simple stateless terminals. There are many studies on user revocation methods which are suitable for stateless terminals. In most of such revocation methods, a unique set of keys is embedded to a user's terminal beforehand. To broadcast digital contents, the center encrypts the contents by a randomly chosen key r (which is called a contents key), and broadcasts the encrypted contents. The center also broadcasts encryptions of r in such a way that only intended valid users can retrieve r correctly. For that sake, the center makes use of the difference of the key sets which have been distributed to terminals.
To evaluate key revocation methods of the above type, we need to pay attention to at least three points; (1) the size of key information which is embedded in a user's terminal, (2) the size of encryptions of r which are broadcasted together with the encrypted contents (the size is sometimes called a message overhead), and (3) the amount of computation necessary in the terminal to retrieve r. There is a certain kind of a trade-off relation among the above three quantity. For example, in a complete subtree (CS) method [8] , terminals do not have to keep so large number of keys inside, but the message overhead is relatively large. In a subset difference (SD) method proposed in [8] , the message overhead can be reduced but each terminal must store large number of keys, and some additional operation is necessary at the terminal. Extensions of these methods are eagerly discussed recently [1] , [6] .
The purpose of this study is to reduce the number of keys which are embedded in a user's terminal in the CS method. The key idea behind our proposal is to use trapdoor permutations. In the original CS method, each terminal is embedded with log 2 N + 1 keys where N is the total number of terminals. In this paper, we consider to assign keys so that a terminal can derive all of log 2 N + 1 keys from just one secret information by using the one-way trapdoor permutations. Consequently, each terminal needs to posses just one information regardless of the number of terminals.
To make the proposed method secure, the one-way trapdoor permutations to be used need to satisfy a certain property. To discuss the property in a theoretically concrete framework, we define new primitives which we named semi-claw-free and strongly semi-claw-free properties since they are similar to the well-studied claw-free property [4] .
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We present formalizations of the two proposed properties as [4] gives for the claw-free property, and clarify the relation among the three properties. It is also shown theoretically that if strongly semi-claw-free permutations are used in the proposed key assignment, then the system is secure against attacks of malicious users. Remark that we do not show the concrete construction of the strongly semi-claw-free permutations in this paper. To the authors' knowledge, there is no existing results on this issue, and we have not yet found the actual construction of such permutations. However if there exists an efficient construction of such permutations, then we can get a simple, efficient, and secure key management scheme in the CS method.
The recent result by Asano [1] can be regarded as a research on the same direction as our study. In [1] , Asano considers to embed a "master-key" to each terminal, where all of log 2 N +1 keys are computable from the master-key. Each terminal has just one master-key, and therefore it is as efficient as the proposed method with respect to the number of keys. However, it must be noted that, to use the master-key system, the center needs to prepare large number of prime numbers, and each terminal needs to perform rather heavy computation to retrieve the contents key. Thus, we insist that exploring strongly semi-claw-free permutations has a valuable future for the implementation of the CS method.
In Section 2, we briefly review the CS method, and introduce our proposed method. In Section 3, semi-clawfree and strongly semi-claw-free permutations are defined and their relation to the claw-free permutations is discussed. In Section 4, we compare the proposed method with other methods and also discuss how the security parameter should be chosen.
Key Management System Using Trapdoor Permutations

The Complete Subtree Method [8]
In a complete subtree (CS) method [8] , a trusted center (or simply a center) uses a tree structure to manage the set of keys which are distributed to users' equipments (terminals). Let U be the set of all terminals, and assume for simplicity that U contains N = 2 h terminals with h a positive integer. The center first constructs a complete binary tree T (with height h), and associates each terminal with a leaf of T . We write n ∈ T to mean that n is a node of T , and write n 1 n 2 if n 1 ∈ T is an ancestor of n 2 ∈ T . We follow the convention that a node is an ancestor of itself, that is, n n for any n ∈ T [5] . Then the center assigns keys of a symmetric key cryptosystem to nodes of T so that each node has a unique key. We write k(n) to represent the key which was assigned to n ∈ T , and p(n) to represent the parent node of n ∈ T . The center embeds a set of keys {k(n)|n ∈ T, n l} to a terminal which corresponds to the leaf l. The center also provides the terminal with the address of the terminal so that the terminal can realize which position in the tree T the terminal locates. It is assumed that the information provided from the center is stored in a tamper-proof part of the terminal. Nobody else except an appropriate part of the terminal can retrieve the stored information.
Consider the case that the center would like to deliver digital contents c to a subset U ⊆ U of terminals. Here R = U \ U is the set of revoked terminals. In this case, the center randomly choose a key r of a symmetric key cryptosystem, and broadcast E(r, c) which is an encryption of c using the key r. To allow terminals in U to obtain r, the center also distributes some additional information which is determined as follows.
1. Calculate T (R) = {n|n ∈ T, ∃l ∈ R, n l}. T (R) is the set of all ancestors of leaves in R.
That is, P(R) is the set of all nodes whose parent nodes belong to T (R), but the nodes themselves do not belong to T (R).
(R)} and distribute all elements in K(R).
Since each terminal is provided with keys of its ancestor nodes, k(n) with n ∈ T (R) is embedded in at least one revoked terminal, and k(n) with n ∈ P(R) is not embedded in any revoked terminal. Also remark that each valid terminal in U has exactly one ancestor in P(R). Therefore, every valid terminal can obtain r by finding and decrypting an appropriate pair in K(R), while no revoked terminal can obtain r. Figure 1 shows an example of a terminal revocation, where n i (1 ≤ i ≤ 7) and l j (1 ≤ j ≤ 8) are nodes. The keys {k(n 1 ), k(n 3 ), k(n 7 ), k(l 7 )} have been given to the terminal l 7 beforehand. When the revoked terminals are {l 3 , l 5 , l 6 } (the black nodes in the figure), the set of all ancestors of the revoked terminals is T (R) = {n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , n 5 , n 6 , l 3 , l 5 , l 6 }. In this case, P(R) = {n 4 , n 7 , l 4 }, and the keys for the calculation of K(R) become {k(n 4 ), k(n 7 ), k(l 4 )}. This time, terminal l 7 carries out the decryption using k(n 7 ).
As for the CS method, the following problems have been pointed out.
1. The problem of the message overhead: it is necessary to broadcast |P(R)| encryptions of r. Analysis in [8] shows that |P(R)| is |R| log 2 N/|R| in the worst case, and grows too rapidly in |R|. 2. The problem of the secret size in a terminal: Each terminal needs to store log 2 N + 1 keys. Generally, the cost for storing information secretly is not small. If N is big, then the cost of each terminal increases.
This paper is to solve the problem 2 above. To reduce the secret size in a terminal, we propose a method which applies trapdoor permutations to assign a key to each node in T .
The Proposed System
The center chooses two one-way trapdoor permutations h L and h R which are open to the public. Here we suppose that h L and h R have the same domain. The trapdoor information is kept by the center safely, and is used when the center assigns a key to terminals. For each node in T , the keys are assigned recursively as follows.
• The key which is assigned to the root node is randomly decided.
• When the key of node n is k,
is assigned to the left child of n as a key.
is assigned to the right child of n as a key. The center provides the address and k(l) to the terminal which corresponds to the leaf l. Therefore the information which each terminal should store safely becomes only one key k(l). Using the address information, the key k(l), and the published one-way permutations h L , h R , each terminal can deduce the keys {k(n)|n l} which are assigned to the ancestors of the terminal. An example of the key generation is shown in Fig. 2 . The terminal at the leaf l 3 receives h −1
L (x))) beforehand where x is a key of a root node. The security of the proposed method depends on the choice of the one-way trapdoor permutations. For example, if we choose permutations which are easily invertible, then a user can obtain keys which are assigned to nonancestor nodes, and the proposed method becomes meaningless. Therefore, we must choose permutations which are difficult to invert. We also need to pay attention to the relation of the two permutations. For example, careless construction of permutations may result in a property such that 
). In this case, a user can obtain keys which are assigned to non-ancestor nodes without inverting the permutations. To make the system secure against attacks of malicious users, the permutations to be used must satisfy certain kinds of properties. In the next section, we will discuss what kind of properties are necessary for the permutations.
Properties Required for the Permutations
Claw-Free Permutations and Its Variances
The property which is required for the permutations in our method is similar to the well-known claw-free property, but slightly different. To start with, we first review the definition of claw-free permutations. The following definition is a special case of Definition 2 in [2] such that g i is also a permutation (thus the case of E i = D i in [2] ).
Definition 1: [claw-free permutation] For a collection of pairs of functions
* , assume the followings:
1. There is an efficient sampling algorithm CF-Gen(1 λ ) which outputs a random index i ∈ I and a trapdoor information TK and TK of f i and g i , respectively. 2. There are efficient sampling algorithms which, on input i, output a random x ∈ D i and z ∈ D i . We write x ← D i and z ← D i as a short hand. 3. Each f i (resp. g i ) is efficiently computable given index i and input x ∈ D i (resp. z ∈ D i ). 4. Each f i (resp. g i ) is a permutation which is efficiently invertible given the trapdoor information TK (resp. TK ) and output y ∈ D i . Namely, using TK (resp. TK ), one can efficiently compute (unique)
.
A is said to (t(λ), (λ))-break C if A runs in time at most t(λ) and Adv
We say that C is a family of claw-free permutations if C is (t(λ), (λ))-secure for any polynomial t(λ) and any nonnegligible function (λ). In other words, it is difficult to find a claw (x, z) (meaning f i (x) = g i (z)) without the trapdoor TK or TK .
The property which is required for the permutations in our method is similar to the claw-free property, but different in the following two points.
1. An adversary in the proposed method, considered in terms of claw-free permutations, needs to find a counterpart, say x, of a given (fixed) information, say z,
(Here z corresponds to a key kept by a revoked terminal, and x corresponds to a key which is used to encrypt r.) This is more difficult task than finding a pair (x, z) satisfying f i (x) = g i (z) with neither x nor z bounded. To discuss this property formally, we introduce the concept of a semi-claw-free property. 2. The collusion of users reveals some information on the inverse permutation. Remark that, in the proposed method, each user has information which is obtained by applying the permutations inversely to the root key.
It can happen that a collection of information on inverse permutations may give adversaries any clue on the trapdoor of permutations. To formalize this situation, we augment an adversary with an oracle which computes the inverse permutation.
The semi-claw-free property is slightly weaker property than the claw-free property, and defined as follows.
Definition 2: [semi-claw-free permutation] For a collection of pairs of functions
* , assume 1-4 in Definition 1 hold. Also assume:
For any probabilistic algorithm B, define the advantage of B as
B is said to (t(λ), (λ))-right-break C if B runs in time at most t(λ) and Adv C B ≥ (λ). C is said to be (t(λ), (λ))-right-secure if no adversary B can (t(λ), (λ))-rightbreak it.
We say that C is a family of right-semi-claw-free permutations if C is (t(λ), (λ))-right-secure for any polynomial t(λ) and any non-negligible function (λ). A family of left-semiclaw-free permutations is defined in a similar way except that the advantage is defined as
We say that C is a family of semi-claw-free permutations if C is a family of right-and left-semi-claw-free permutations.
Lemma 1:
A family of claw-free permutations implies a family of semi-claw-free permutations. Sketch of proof : Let B be an probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which finds x with f i (x) = g i (z) for a given z. A claw-finder A is constructible by feeding B a random z ∈ D i , where B will return x with f i (x) = g i (z). Now (x, z) is a claw pair which A should output.
Let O i be an oracle whose input (query) is a tuple (x, p 1 
Thus, the oracle computes the inverse permutations for given information x. A family of semi-claw-free permutations is said to be strongly semi-claw-free if it is even secure against the more powerful adversary with the oracle. Formally, the family of strongly semi-claw-free permutations is given as follows.
Definition 3: [strongly semi-claw-free permutation] For a collection of pairs of functions
5. For any probabilistic algorithm C, define the advantage of C as
We insist that C is not allowed to make a query of the form ( f i (x), g i , .
.) to the oracle O i . C is said to (t(λ), (λ))-right-break C if C runs in time at most t(λ)
and Adv
C C ≥ (λ). C is said to be (t(λ), (λ))-rightsecure if no adversary C can (t(λ), (λ))-right-break it.
We say that C is a family of strongly right-semi-claw-free permutations if C is (t(λ), (λ))-right-secure for any polynomial t(λ) and any non-negligible function (λ). A family of strongly left-semi-claw-free permutations and a family of strongly semi-claw-free permutations are defined in a natural way.
Remark that the adversary C in the above definition is allowed to ask the oracle to invert any information except to invert f i (x) with respect to g i . This simulates the situation that so many adversaries collude and so much information has been leaked to the adversary C, but none of his/her malicious colleague have had information on z with f i (x) = g i (z).
It is obvious that a family of strongly semi-claw-free permutations is also semi-claw-free. Also we have the following two separation results.
Lemma 2:
If there exists a family C of claw-free permutations, then there exists a family C of permutations which is claw-free but not strongly semi-claw-free.
. If C is a family of claw-free permutations, then C is also claw-free. Indeed, we can construct a claw-finder A for C from a claw-finder A for C : A will find a claw (x , z ) with f i ( f i (x )) = g i ( f i (z )), and A would output (x, z) = ( f i (x ), f i (z )) which satisfies f i (x) = g i (z). C is not strongly semi-claw-free since we can construct an adversary A which finds x with f i (x ) = g i (z ) for given z utilizing the oracle: A first computes y 1 = f i (g i ( f i (z ))), asks the oracle to compute y 2 = f
i (y 1 )), and again asks the oracle to compute
i (y 2 )). A 1 P P P P P P P P P P P P q P P P P P P P P P P P P i outputs f i (y 3 ) as x . Remark that
and therefore f i (x ) = g i (z ).
Lemma 3:
If there exists a family C of strongly semi-clawfree permutations, then there exists a family C of permutations which is strongly semi-claw-free but not claw-free.
If C is a family of strongly semi-claw-free permutations, then C is also strongly semi-claw-free. An intruder A for C feeds its input to A and A finds the counterpart of the input. A needs to simulate the oracle O for A , but it is not difficult; if the query from A is ⊥ then simply return ⊥ as the answer from O , otherwise, make the same query to A's own oracle O and pass the answer from O as the answer from O . C is not claw-free since (⊥, ⊥) is always a claw pair which is known to every claw-finder.
The relation among claw-free, semi-claw-free, and strongly semi-claw-free properties evaluated in this section is shown in Fig. 3. 
The Security of the Proposed System
This section is to discuss the security of the proposed method and the strongly semi-claw-free property. In this section, the number of users is regarded as a constant in the security parameter. We use the same notations such as U, R, k(·), T (R) and P(R) as in Section 2, and consider the scenario such that all users in R collude with each other to find a key k(n) for any n ∈ P(R). This attack scenario can be formalized as follows.
Definition 4: [adversary for key management system]
Let h L and h R be the pair of permutations used in the proposed key management system. Also define K (h L ,h R ) (R) = {(a u , k(u))|u ∈ R} where a u stands for the address (position in T ) of the user u. Thus, K (h L ,h R ) (R) is the set of pairs of an addresses and a key of revoked users. For an adversary A, define
We say that a key management system is secure with (
is negligible for any polynomial-time adversary A.
The following lemma says that the strongly semi-clawfree property is essential in the proposed key management system.
Lemma 4:
If the pair ( f i , g i ) is chosen randomly from a family of strongly semi-claw-free permutations C, then the proposed system is secure, where we regard h L and h R as f i and g i , respectively. Proof : Let A be an algorithm attacking the proposed key management system. By utilizing A, we construct a strongly semi-claw finder
O works as follows.
1. Uniformly choose a set R ⊆ U.
2. Uniformly choose a node n which is a sibling of a node in P(R). Without loss of generality, we assume that n is a left-child of its parent. 3. Define k(n) = x, and compute k(n ) for each ancestor n of n using h L and h R . 4. Use the oracle O which is augmented to the algorithm B, and compute k(u) for all u ∈ R. 5. Feed A with K (h L ,h R ) (R) and receive z . 6. Let z be the output of B.
The algorithm A will find a key which is associated with a node, say n , in P(R). Since P(R) contains at most |R| log 2 (N/|R|) nodes [8] , n is the sibling of n with probability
Remark that p is non-negligible value. Therefore, if A succeeds in the attack with non-negligible probability, then B succeeds in finding the counterpart of given x with nonnegligible probability.
Evaluation and Comparison
Uniqueness of Keys
In the complete subtree method, it is essential that different nodes in T have different keys. However, unfortunately, key assignments given by the proposed method does not always satisfy this property. Keys of nodes are automatically determined for the chosen root key, but the center cannot predict which key is assigned to which node. That is to say, as a result of calculating the inverse of one-way permutations, there is possibility of assigning a same key for different nodes. If a same key is assigned for multiple nodes, then there is a case that revocation does not work appropriately. Therefore, a duplicated assignment of a key must be absolutely avoided.
In the rest of this section, we evaluate the probability p dup that a same key happens to be assigned to multiple nodes. Remark that the key assignment is executed only once at the initialization step of the system. Therefore, if p dup is rather small value, then there is no problem from a practical viewpoint. Indeed, the center can determine the root key, derive all other keys and then check the duplication of keys. With the probability 1 − p dup , the key assignment is unique, and with the probability p dup , the center finds the duplication of keys. In the latter case, the center can retry using another root key. From the expected value of the geometric random variable, the expected number of tries is
, which is 2 if p dup = 0.5, and 1.1 if
The precise evaluation of p dup is not easy. The probability depends on the one-way permutations to be employed, and practical one-way permutations have rather complicated structure which is difficult to analyze. Therefore, in this section, we approximate the behavior of one-way permutations so that the derived keys distribute uniformly. That is to say, we evaluate p dup assuming that the keys of nodes are chosen randomly and uniformly.
The following discussion is quite similar to the treatment of so-called "birthday paradox". Let r be the number of possible keys of the symmetric key cryptosystem. That is to say, the keys are expressed in log 2 r bit. When the number of users is N, there exists 2N − 1 nodes in the tree T for the key management. This number is written as k in the following. There exist r k ways in all for assigning the keys to each node. Among these r k assignments, the number of assignments in which the keys are unique is
Therefore, the probability p unique (= 1 − p dup ) that all the assigned keys are unique is
If k r, then it is widely known that p unique is approx-
2r . In the following, we derive precise upper bound and lower bound of p unique . Remind a well-known inequality
First the upper bound becomes
and the lower bound becomes
By applying inequality ln(1
The upper and the lower bounds are obtained as
Generally, if we increase the bit length of the keys, then p dup decreases and p unique increases. Table 2 shows the number of keys to be stored in each terminal in the proposed method, the CS method (the complete subset method in [8] ), and the MK method (the Method 1 in [1] ). For the MK method, we assume that a binary tree is employed instead of the general a-tree case. In the proposed method and the MK method, regardless of the number of terminals, just one secret key is enough for each terminal. However, in both methods, we need to make the key length sufficiently long so that the system remains secure against possible attack by malicious users.
Comparison to Other Methods
In all methods in Table 2 except CS method, we need to perform some additional operations to derive the key which is used to encrypt the digital contents. However, since the actual construction of the strongly semi-claw-free permutation is not given yet, and this makes us difficult to compare our proposal with the other methods in terms of practical complexity measures. Therefore, the table is just a rough estimation of the complexity. If we assume that the computation of a semi-claw-free permutation is possible in a constant time to the security parameters, then the time complexity of the proposed method is O(log 2 N) since each terminal may have to compute the strongly semi-claw-free permutations at most log 2 N times. In the case of MK method, the prime number generation is needed and its complexity is O((log 2 N) 5 ) [1] .
Concluding Remarks
A new method for assigning keys in the complete subset method is considered. The proposed method makes use of trapdoor permutations, and the secret information to be stored in each terminal is reduced to just one key. The property which the permutations must satisfy is formalized as strongly semi-claw-free property. We clarified the relation between the strongly semi-claw-free property and the clawfree property, and also showed that if strongly semi-clawfree permutations are used, then the proposed key assignment method is secure. The issue of strongly semi-claw-free permutations is theoretically interesting by itself. We have clarified the relation between the strongly semi-claw-free and the claw-free properties, and find that no implication results hold between the two properties. In fact, construction examples of clawfree permutations presented in [4] are not strongly semiclaw-free unfortunately. The actual construction of strongly semi-claw-free permutations will be significant from both of the theoretical and practical viewpoints.
